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In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,1
the Supreme Court held that on the facts there presented, the
Free Exercise Clause protected a wedding-cake baker who
conscientiously objected to making a cake for a same-sex wedding.
The decision has been widely described as a very narrow ruling
on odd facts.2 My central claim in this Article is that the opinion has
much broader implications than have been recognized.
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Religious Studies,
University of Virginia, and Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University
of Texas. This Article is based on the First Annual Religious Liberty Lecture at Brigham
Young University Law School, on September 12, 2018. Portions of this Article draw from an
amicus brief and blog posts co-authored with Professor Thomas C. Berg. All websites were
last visited on June 9, 2019. Perma links have been provided where possible.
1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. See, e.g., KAREN MOULDING & NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 11:1 (Oct. 2018 Update) (“the
decision on extraordinarily narrow grounds actually proved, at least in the immediate
debate, to be a dud”); Rodney W. Harrell, State Religious Free-Exercise Defenses to
Nondiscrimination Laws: Still Relevant After Masterpiece Cakeshop, 87 UMKC L. REV. 297, 314
(2019) (“the Court resolved this case narrowly on facts that are not likely to be repeated”);
Adam Liptak, In Narrow Decision, Supreme Court Sides with Baker Who Turned Away Gay
Couple, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/us/politics
/supreme-court-sides-with-baker-who-turned-away-gay-couple.html [https://perma.cc/K
WV6-Z6Z3]; Eugene Volokh, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Leaves Almost All the Big
Questions Unresolved, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 4, 2018, 10:49 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/04/the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-leaves
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I do not mean merely that a narrow judicial statement of a new
right may evolve over time into a much broader right, although that
is certainly true.3 And I do not mean merely that Justice Kavanaugh
is likely to be more sympathetic to the free exercise of religion, and
less sympathetic to gay rights, than Justice Kennedy would have
been, although that is probably also true. I mean that the Masterpiece
opinion, as written, combined with a bit of savvy lawyering on the
part of those representing conscientious objectors, logically leads to
a general protection for conscientious objectors, at least in
religiously important contexts such as weddings.
Since same-sex marriage first became a prominent public issue
in 2004, I have advocated for marriage equality with religious
exemptions—full legal equality for same-sex marriages, with
exemptions that protect non-profit religious organizations from
having to celebrate or recognize those marriages, and with religious
exemptions for very small for-profit businesses from having to
assist with the wedding or its celebration so long as other providers
of the same goods or services are readily available.4 I have never
doubted that the conscientious objectors who claim this exemption
are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but I have
argued that they should have an affirmative defense to protect the
free exercise of religion. The solution to this conflict is to protect the
rights of each side—the right of both same-sex couples and
conscientious objectors to live their own lives by their own deepest
values and in accord with their deeply felt identity. As has been
explained elsewhere, sexual minorities and religious minorities
make fundamentally similar claims on the larger society.5
[https://perma.cc/ZB43-VSF8]; Amy Howe, ScotusBlog, Opinion Analysis: Court Rules
(Narrowly) for Baker in Same-Sex-Wedding-Cake Case [Updated], (June 4, 2018, 4:07 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-for-baker
-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/ [https://perma.cc/VWE6-RBFR].
3. Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017–2018
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139.
4. This advocacy appears in articles, briefs, and letters to legislators and other policy
makers. These materials are collected in DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME
THREE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACTS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGISLATION, AND THE
CULTURE WARS 763–976 (2018), and DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME FOUR:
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AFTER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, WITH MORE ON THE
CULTURE WARS 695–863 (2018).
5. Douglas Laycock, Liberty and Justice for All, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND
THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 24, 26–27 (William Eskridge & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds.
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Government should not interfere with sexual orientation, and it
should not interfere with the exercise of religion, without the most
compelling reasons.
The Masterpiece opinion does not go so far, but it is consistent
with this view. The Court set the right tone, insisting on the need to
respect the rights and dignity of both sides. “[G]ay persons and gay
couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity
and worth. . . . The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to
others must be given great weight and respect by the courts.”6 “At
the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected
forms of expression. . . . [T]he Commission was obliged under the
Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and
tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”7
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado Court
of Appeals had failed to treat the baker’s religious commitments
with either neutrality or respect, and their obvious bias violated
the Free Exercise Clause.8 This bias was manifested in hostile
comments and in unequal treatment of customers and bakers on
opposite sides of the moral debate over same-sex marriage. Savvy
officials can suppress their hostile comments. But savvy
conscientious objectors can smoke out unequal treatment by
sending testers to request goods and services that retailers
who support same-sex marriage are likely to refuse. A state that
protects these liberal retailers while penalizing religious
conscientious objectors violates the Free Exercise Clause under
Masterpiece, and on reasonable readings of the Court’s recent
free-exercise precedents.

2018); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”:
Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411, 2416–30 (1997).
6. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
7. Id. at 1727, 1731.
8. Id. at 1729–32.
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I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Deeper analysis of Masterpiece has to begin in 1990, with
Employment Division v. Smith.9 Smith changed the law of free
exercise in important ways, but 29 years later, the meaning of that
change remains unsettled. Mr. Smith consumed peyote at a
worship service of the Native American Church,10 where the central
ritual is the supervised consumption of peyote in a highly
structured ceremony.11
Hallucinogenic drugs have been used for religious purposes
throughout human history and all around the world.12 Peyote is a
naturally occurring hallucinogen. One consumes peyote by eating
the bud of a cactus plant; it is tough and hard to chew, and it often
causes nausea or vomiting.13 So there has never been a significant
recreational market for peyote. But American Indians were
using it for religious purposes when the earliest Spanish explorers
arrived, and probably for millennia before that, and they still are.14
The Native American Church teaches total avoidance of all other
drugs, including alcohol, and is generally viewed as a positive
influence in the lives of its members.15 Religious use of peyote
by the Native American Church has long been exempt from the
federal drug laws,16 and after the Court’s decision, Congress
extended the protection to all American Indians and preempted
contrary state law.17
Smith was fired when his supervisor learned that he had
attended the peyote service. He did not sue over his discharge, but
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. Id. at 874.
11. Robert L. Bergman, Navajo Peyote Use: Its Apparent Safety, 128 AM. J. PSYCH. 695,
695–96 (1971).
12. See Brief of the Council on Spiritual Practices, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents 4–10, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2237542 (collecting scholarly sources).
13. EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: THE DIVINE CACTUS 83, 187 (2d ed. 1996); James S.
Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND
PHILOSOPHY 96, 98 (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock eds. 1956).
14. OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 17 (1987).
15. Bergman, supra note 11, at 698.
16. Listing of Additional Drugs Subject to Control; Temporary Exemption From
Record-Keeping Requirements, 31 FED. REG. 4679 (Mar. 19, 1966), now codified as 21 C.F.R.
§ 1307.31 (2018).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012).
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he did apply for unemployment compensation. The Supreme Court
had repeatedly held that workers were entitled to unemployment
compensation when they lost their jobs for religious reasons—for
refusing to work on the Sabbath most commonly,18 or for refusing
to make weapons.19
The relevant legal rule came from two leading cases, Sherbert v.
Verner20 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.21 Sherbert and Yoder held that
government may not burden a religious practice unless that burden
is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.22 So, for
example, government could refuse to exempt people who
conscientiously objected to paying taxes.23 But there was no such
compelling interest in withholding unemployment compensation
from workers with religious practices that conflicted with their
employers’ demands,24 or even in an extra year or two of formal
education for Amish children.25
In Smith, the state claimed a compelling interest in a noexceptions drug-enforcement policy. Smith replied that the tightly
controlled religious use of peyote was not dangerous, so that the
state’s interest was nowhere near compelling. That is how the case
was argued, but that is not how the Court decided it.
Instead, and without being asked, Justice Scalia said the state
didn’t have to show a compelling interest at all. If the law was
neutral and generally applicable—a phrase he never defined—it
could be applied even to the central ritual of a worship service.26
The opinion appears to say that if the law is neutral and generally
18. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
19. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. Id. at 215 (“only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403
(“any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a
‘compelling state interest’”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); id. at 406
(“only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible
limitation”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
23. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982).
24. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718–19;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09.
25. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221–29.
26. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–89 (1990).
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applicable, the state doesn’t have to have any reason at all for
refusing religious exemptions.27 It can just say no. Smith was 5-4,
the work of four conservatives (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and White) plus Justice Stevens.
The rhetorical tone of the opinion was hostile to religious
exemptions. Lower courts responded to the rhetoric and initially
said that pretty much every law was neutral and generally
applicable—even a zoning law that categorically excluded
churches.28 The city had a reason for excluding churches that was
more than just hostility to churches, so according to the Eighth
Circuit, the law was neutral and generally applicable.29
But Sherbert and Yoder were not overruled. Scalia had only five
votes, and it’s a reasonable inference that one of those five said he
wouldn’t vote to overrule anything. So Sherbert and Yoder were
distinguished and given new explanations.
Yoder had held that Wisconsin could not require the Amish to
send their children to high school. Scalia claimed that Yoder was
based on a hybrid of free exercise and the parents’ right to control
their children’s education.30 This hybrid-rights theory seemed to
contemplate that if you combined a failed parental-rights claim
with a failed free-exercise claim, the two failed claims would
somehow add up to a successful hybrid claim. That never made any
sense, and almost nothing has come of the hybrid-rights theory.31 It

27. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 630 (2003) (“laws
that are neutral and generally applicable require no justification, no matter how
seriously they burden the religious claimant, or how trivial the government interest is in
their execution”).
28. The zoning ordinance listed a number of specific uses in commercial zones but did
not list churches. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 466 n.1 (8th Cir.
1991) (setting out the ordinance). The city “unequivocally interpreted” this listing to
categorically exclude churches. Id. at 468 n.2. The City Council subsequently passed a
resolution making even more explicit its view that churches were excluded. Id. at 467.
29. Id. at 472. See also Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 777–78 & nn.188–89 (1998) (noting other examples).
30. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
31. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting hybrid
parental-rights and free-exercise claim, and reviewing earlier decisions rejecting or
minimizing the exception); Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The
Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception”, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 573, 587–605 (2003) (attempting to defend the exception, but reviewing the many cases
refusing to apply it or interpreting it in ways that make it meaningless); Lund, supra note 27,
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is notable principally for Scalia’s choice to rely on an unenumerated
right—a category of rights that he always said he didn’t believe
in32—rather than the textually explicit Free Exercise Clause.
The more important reinterpretation was what Scalia said
about Sherbert v. Verner, the first of the unemploymentcompensation cases. He said that the law in Sherbert was not neutral
and generally applicable, because the state accepted “at least some”
reasons for refusing available work.33 You don’t forfeit
unemployment compensation if you decline a job far beneath your
skill level, or two hundred miles from your home. You don’t have
to work in a strip club or a massage parlor. There weren’t many
acceptable reasons for refusing work and demanding a government
check instead, but there were “at least some.” Because the
state accepted some secular reasons for refusing work, it had to also
accept religious reasons. Mrs. Sherbert was still constitutionally
entitled to her unemployment compensation, even after Smith. But
Smith was not, because the Court treated the case as a
challenge to Oregon’s drug laws rather than as a challenge to its
unemployment compensation laws. In an earlier decision in the
same case, the Court had reasoned that if Oregon could imprison
Smith for religious use of peyote, surely it could withhold
unemployment compensation.34
The implications of the Court’s explanation of Sherbert v. Verner
were initially subordinated to the opinion’s hostile rhetoric about
exemptions. But think about it. If a law with even a few secular
exceptions isn’t neutral and generally applicable, then not many
laws are. Exceptions grease the wheels for legislation; legislators
often exempt their friends and contributors, and they exempt
interest groups that might be strong enough to block passage of the
bill. There were no exceptions in the law banning peyote,35 but such
at 630–32 (collecting opinions and articles dismissing the exception, including a Justice Scalia
opinion that is plainly inconsistent with any version of the hybrid-rights exception).
32. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that parental rights are not judicially enforceable because the Constitution does not
mention them).
33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
34. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988).
35. The Oregon drug laws had a medical exception, but the state told the Court that
that exception did not apply to peyote because it was a Schedule I drug. Brief for Petitioners
13–14 & n.6, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846.
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across-the-board total prohibitions are fairly unusual. If a law that
burdens religion is not neutral, or not generally applicable, it still
has to be justified by a compelling government interest.36 And
Smith’s discussion of Sherbert implies that not many laws are
neutral and generally applicable.
The Court returned to the issue in 1993, in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.37 Santeria is a Cuban religion that
combines elements of Catholicism with elements of Yoruba religion
from West Africa.38 Its central ritual is the sacrifice of small
animals.39 There were an estimated 50,000 Santerians in South
Florida, mostly practicing in secret.40
When the Church of the Lukumi proposed to take the faith
public, Hialeah passed four ordinances to prohibit animal sacrifice.
They were drafted to ban Santeria without affecting any of the other
myriad reasons why humans kill animals.41 The most tightly
targeted of these ordinances made it a crime to unnecessarily kill an
animal in a ritual or ceremony, not for the primary purpose of food
consumption.42 Omit any ritual and the ordinance did not apply.
Make the ritual secondary to food production, or persuade the city
that killing the animal was necessary, and the ordinance did not
apply. The city said this ordinance was neutral and generally
applicable; no one could sacrifice an animal as so defined. The
church had not gotten a single vote in the lower courts,43 which
highlights how Smith was initially received.
36. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)
(“The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith
requirements is not ‘water[ed] . . . down,’ but ‘really means what it says’ (alteration in
Lukumi) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888)); Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (“our decisions in the
unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where a state has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’
without compelling reason”).
37. 508 U.S. 520.
38. Id. at 524.
39. Id. at 525.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 535 (“almost the only conduct subject to Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71
is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. The texts show that they were drafted
in tandem to achieve this result.”).
42. Id. at 551 (setting out Ordinance 87-52).
43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (ruling against the church even before Smith, on other grounds), aff’d mem.,
936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991) (after Smith), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (unreported; without
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The Supreme Court reversed, 9-0. These ordinances were not
neutral,44 they were not generally applicable,45 and the Court said
they didn’t come close.46 The Court discussed neutrality and
general applicability in separate sections of the opinion.47 It still did
not define either term. It discussed neutrality in terms of
“targeting” religion, the “purpose” or “object” of a law, and
discrimination “because of” religion.48 But no such language
appeared in the section on general applicability. Instead, the Court
applied what amounts to a standard.
The city said that animal sacrifice undermined government
interests in public health and in protecting animals. But the
ordinances failed to regulate other activities that undermined those
same interests, to the same or greater degree.49 And not just other
killings of animals, the most obvious analogy. The city’s health
officer admitted that the garbage dumpsters of restaurants were a
bigger health hazard than the carcasses of sacrificed animals. But
one was banned and the other was not. So the ban on sacrifice was
not generally applicable.50
It was an element of the offense that killing the animal be
unnecessary, and the city said that religious killings were
unnecessary. Of course they are unnecessary only if the religion is
false, which is clearly what the city believed. No American
government gets to decide which religions are true and which are
false, but the Supreme Court did not say that. It made a different
point of broader potential application: that when the city said that
secular killings were necessary but religious killings were not, it
“devalues religious reasons for killing” animals, “judging them to
be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.”51
a dissenting vote); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME TWO: THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE 153–54 (2011) (reviewing the litigation in the court of appeals, and summarizing its
four-sentence order affirming on the opinion of the trial court). I was lead appellate counsel
for the church, so I report these unreported facts from personal knowledge.
44. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532–40, 542 (opinion of the Court); id. at 540–42 (plurality
opinion).
45. Id. at 542–46 (opinion of the Court).
46. Id. at 543 (“these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to
protect First Amendment rights.”).
47. Id. at 532–42 (neutrality); id. at 542–46 (general applicability).
48. Id. at 532–35, 538, 542.
49. Id. at 543.
50. Id. at 544–45.
51. Id. at 537.
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So once again, if we take the Court’s reasoning seriously, many
laws will fail the test of general applicability; many laws that
burden religion will require compelling justification. Any time the
government prohibits a religious practice but exempts some
analogous secular practice that undermines the alleged
government interest, it decides that the secular practice is more
important, more valuable, more something that makes it more
deserving of exemption. Government devalues the religious
practice as compared to the secular practice.
I do not claim that the Court understood or consciously
intended all of this in Smith, or even in Lukumi. “Neutral and
generally applicably law” was an undefined intuitive concept in
Smith. A criminal prohibition with literally no exceptions qualified
if anything did, so the Court had no occasion to examine the
concept or clarify its intuition. Lukumi made clear that Smith had
not repealed the Free Exercise Clause and that the requirements of
neutrality and general applicability had enforceable content. But
Lukumi was at the other end of the continuum from Smith, with laws
that obviously were neither neutral nor generally applicable, so the
Court said that it “need not define with precision” the meaning of
general applicability.52
But the rule that secular exceptions generally require religious
exceptions is not some creative reinterpretation dreamed up years
after the opinions were issued. The requirement was there in Smith
if one read carefully. Smith unambiguously concluded that the
unemployment compensation law in Sherbert was not neutral or
generally applicable, and much followed from that conclusion.
I noted the opinion’s two sides at the time, reading its rhetoric
to suggest a general rule of no exemptions and its many limits as
creating “enough exceptions and limitations to swallow most of its
new rule.”53 If the exceptions and limitations were not taken
seriously, then Smith created “the legal framework for
persecution.”54 But if the Court were serious about the limitations

52. Id. at 542.
53. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54.
54. Id. at 54, 59.
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and exceptions, “then much religious exercise can still claim
judicial protection.”55
I have not quite been accused of making this up years after the
fact, but I have been accused of now making an argument that
“would largely eviscerate Smith’s no-exemptions-required rule.”56
If Smith really laid down a flat rule that no exemptions are required,
then renewed attention to the requirement of “generally applicable
law” would do substantial damage—perhaps even “eviscerate”
—that alleged rule. But the question is whether Smith created such
a rule for nearly all challenged laws, or only for those laws that are
truly neutral and generally applicable, and if the latter, what counts
as neutral and generally applicable. I elaborated the protective
reading of Smith at the time:
In such individualized decisionmaking processes, the Court’s
explanation of its unemployment compensation cases would
seem to require that religion get something analogous to mostfavored nation status. Religious speech should be treated as well
as political speech, religious land uses should be treated as well
as any other land use of comparable intensity, and so forth. . . .
The other point in the Court’s explanation of its unemployment
compensation cases is secular exemptions. If the state grants
exemptions from its law for secular reasons, then it must grant
comparable exemptions for religious reasons. . . .
The requirement that religious conduct get the benefit of secular
exemptions is a requirement of broad potential application. . . .
Exemptions for secular interests without exemptions for religious
practice reflect a hostile indifference to religion. . . . [S]uch a
discriminatory pattern of exemptions shows that the legislature’s
goals do not require universal application, and that the legislature
values the exempted secular activities more highly than the
constitutionally protected religious activities. This pattern of
exemptions reflects a legislative judgment that the free exercise of
religion is less important than the demands of some special
interest group of no constitutional significance. But that is a
judgment inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee.57

55. Id. at 42.
56. James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)Honesty 42, https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3262826, forthcoming in 2019 WIS. L REV.
57. Laycock, supra note 53, at 49–51.
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All these implications were clearly there from the beginning,
but few seemed to notice. Between Smith and Lukumi, lower courts
gave no weight to Smith’s limitations and exceptions. After Lukumi,
that began to change. But on its facts, Lukumi was an extreme case;
the ordinances were clearly enacted to suppress a single religious
practice. Government lawyers argue that every law is neutral and
generally applicable except a few rare laws as extreme as the
ordinances in Lukumi. And a few lower courts have actually
attended to the issue and then agreed.58
But more courts have concluded that even one or a few secular
exceptions, if they undermine the interest the law is alleged to
protect, show that the law is not generally applicable. Most
prominently, Newark had a rule that police officers must be clean
shaven, with a medical exception for officers with skin conditions
that make it difficult to shave. That was it; only one relevant
exception. But the court of appeals said that Newark had to also
exempt Muslim officers religiously obligated to grow a beard.
Newark had made a value judgment that medical needs are more
important than religious needs, and that value judgment is what
Smith and Lukumi forbid.59 The Newark opinion in the Third Circuit
was written by a judge most readers will have heard of, Samuel
Alito. There are nine or so similar decisions in courts around
the country.60
58. A leading case, and probably the most extreme of these decisions, is Stormans Inc.
v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). It is analyzed at length in Douglas Laycock &
Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1
(2016). Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649–55 (10th Cir.
2006), holds a zoning law generally applicable. Most zoning laws are highly individualized
and subject to many exceptions, but in this case the city had apparently never granted an
exception for any daycare center, which was the church’s requested use.
59. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364–66 (3d Cir. 1999).
60. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738–40 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding rule prohibiting
counseling student from referring same-sex couple to another counselor not generally
applicable where there were exceptions for other values conflicts and for failure to pay);
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206–12 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding permit requirement
for keeping animals not generally applicable where there were exceptions for zoos, circuses,
hardship, and extraordinary circumstances); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding zoning ordinance that excluded synagogue not neutral
and not generally applicable where there was exception for lodges and private clubs);
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165–68 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
textually absolute rule prohibiting posting or attachment of any sign to government property
not neutral where variety of exceptions had been made in practice); Keeler v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885–86 (D. Md. 1996) (holding landmarking ordinance subject
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II. THE SECULAR EXCEPTION IN MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
This at last brings me back to Masterpiece Cakeshop. Masterpiece
is one of a handful of cases where conscientious objectors in the
wedding business refuse to assist with a same-sex wedding and get
sued under a state public-accommodations law, or in a few of the
cases, feel threatened by such a law and sue to enjoin its
enforcement or have it declared unconstitutional as applied to their
religiously motivated actions.
These vendors understand marriage as an inherently religious
relationship, and therefore they understand weddings as
inherently religious events. Jack Phillips, the owner and cake artist
at Masterpiece Cakeshop, testified to this understanding, citing
various scriptural bases for marriage and concluding that his
objection “has everything to do with the nature of the wedding
ceremony itself, and about my religious belief about what marriage
is and whether God will be pleased with me and my work.”61 “The
issue was the nature of the event and that I cannot participate in
such a ceremony based on my sincerely held religious beliefs.”62
The wedding vendors’ job is to make their part of the wedding
the best and most memorable it can be; they quite reasonably
understand themselves to be promoting and celebrating the
wedding and the marriage. The Washington florist in a similar case
had happily served her long-time gay customer, knowing that the
to strict scrutiny where there were exceptions for financial hardship to owner, substantial
benefit to city, and best interests of community); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551–
56 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding requirement that freshman live in dorm not generally applicable
where one-third of freshmen were exempt for diverse array of reasons); Mitchell Cty. v.
Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 15–16 (Iowa 2012) (holding ban on steel-wheeled tractors not
generally applicable where state and county permitted other wheel coverings that did similar
damage to roads); Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 556–57 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding ban on possession of bird feathers not neutral where there were exceptions for
taxidermists, academics, researchers, museums, and educational institutions). There is also
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2004), which reversed summary
judgment for defendants where a single exception granted to another student, and earlier
exceptions granted to plaintiff, suggested that defendant had a system of individualized
exemptions. But Axson-Flynn curiously distinguished individualized exemptions from
categorical exemptions, even though Lukumi relied on many categorical exceptions, and even
though categorical exemptions are generally broader, giving favored treatment to more
people, than individualized exemptions.
61. Joint Appendix 167, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4232758.
62. Id.
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flowers were for his same-sex partner, but she said that she could
not do the wedding.63 To believers like these, the wedding is a
religious event that is religiously prohibited. It is a sacrilege, and
they cannot participate.
These cases have mostly been litigated under state-law
protections for religious liberty. They have mostly been in blue or
purple states, because those are the only states with state-wide gayrights laws.64 And before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Masterpiece, the religious claimants nearly all lost—a photographer
in New Mexico,65 a baker in Oregon,66 a bed and breakfast in
Hawaii,67 a wedding venue in New York,68 videographers in
Minnesota,69 the florist in Washington.70 The Washington florist has
lost again on remand,71 and a website designer in Colorado has lost
a pre-enforcement challenge to the law that was at issue in
Masterpiece.72 Religious claimants continue to lose in these cases in
part because the judges have so far read Masterpiece narrowly, and
63. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. 2015), vacated, 138 S. Ct.
2671 (2018).
64. On the extremely small chance that anyone is reading this Article decades from
now, when usage might have changed, blue states are states where the Democratic party has
a normally reliable majority. In red states, the Republican party has a normally reliable
majority. Purple states are more closely contested states that may swing back and forth
between the two major parties.
65. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
66. Klein v. Or. Bur. of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), review denied
(Or. June 21, 2018), vacated, 2019 WL 2493912 (U.S. June 17, 2019).
67. Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919 (Hawaii Ct. App. 2018), cert.
rejected, 2018 WL 3358586 (Hawaii July 10, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1319 (2019).
68. Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016).
69. Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal
pending, No. 17-3352 (8th Cir.).
70. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2015), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
71. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, 2019 WL 2382063 (Wash. June 6, 2019)
(emphasizing the passages in Masterpiece favorable to gay rights, id. at *6–7, acknowledging
that Masterpiece precludes adjudicatory bodies from discriminating against religion, id. at *8,
but concluding that the state’s Attorney General remains free to discriminate against
religion, id. at *9–11).
72. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 16-cv-02372, 2019 WL 2161666 (D. Colo. May 17,
2019) (disregarding Masterpiece on the ground that the Court “avoided a ruling on the
merits,” id. at *3, and granting summary judgment to the state enforcement officer on the
basis of a pro-government reading of Smith and Lukumi, id. at *11). This case involved only
the provision prohibiting communications suggesting that some customers would be
unwelcome on the basis of their membership in a protected class. Plaintiff’s challenge to the
provision requiring that it serve such customers was dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at *3
n.5; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 52.
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more fundamentally, because the records in these cases were
compiled before Masterpiece, so they did not contain evidence of
discrimination of the sort on which Masterpiece relied.
A California baker won on free-speech grounds in a state trial
court.73 Given the California Supreme Court’s resistance to
religious exemptions,74 it seemed likely that this decision would be
reversed, but for whatever reason—possibly the intervening
decision in Masterpiece—the plaintiff state agency did not appeal.75
At least two other cases, each involving ordinances enacted by blue
cities in red states, are still pending in state courts.76 The Oregon
case is still pending in the state courts on remand, and presumably,
a new cert petition will be filed in the Washington case.
Masterpiece arose in Colorado, which has no statute protecting
religious practices from the state and no decision squarely deciding
whether the free exercise clause of the state constitution creates a
right to religious exemptions.77 So federal claims played a larger
73. Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., No. BCV-17102855 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb 5, 2018), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu
/cases/department-fair-employment-housing-v-cathys-creations/
[https://perma.cc
/WC5X-LA24].
74. N. Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cty. Sup’r Ct., 189 P.3d
959 (Cal. 2008) (refusing to exempt medical practice where one physician declined to provide
artificial insemination to lesbian patient and patient was successfully treated by another
physician in the same practice); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Sup’r Ct., 85 P.3d
67 (Cal. 2004) (refusing to exempt Catholic Charities from obligation to cover contraception
in its employee insurance plan); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1996) (refusing to exempt owner of small building from renting to unmarried couple).
75. Appellant’s Opening Brief 9, Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations,
Inc., No. F0077802 in Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 2018 WL 5014291 (Oct. 12, 2018). This is an
appeal from a denial of attorneys’ fees to the defendant baker. The chronology in plaintiff’s
appellate brief is unclear. It says that the trial court entered judgment on May 1, 2018. Id. at
12. The state had sixty days to appeal. Cal. R. of Ct. 8.104. Masterpiece came down on June 4,
within that sixty-day period. But plaintiff filed its motion for attorneys’ fees on May 10,
before Masterpiece and long before the time for appeal had expired. Brief at 12. The state’s
brief does not clarify. Respondent’s Brief, 2018 WL 6002854 (Nov. 13, 2018).
76. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
(rejecting challenge to ordinance requiring calligraphers to produce invitations and other
goods for same-sex weddings), review granted (Ariz. Nov. 20, 2018); Lexington Fayette Urban
Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-00745-MR, 2017 WL
2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017) (holding that printer did not discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation when he refused to print t-shirts for a gay-pride festival), review granted
(Ky. Oct. 25, 2017). Note that Hands on Originals, the Kentucky case, is not a wedding case,
but also that it presents a more straightforward free-speech claim, because the printer is
being asked to print an explicit message in somewhat permanent form).
77. COLO. CONST. art II, § 4.
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role. The Masterpiece baker, Jack Phillips, claimed that his cakes
were works of art protected by the Free Speech Clause. And if you
look at the pictures of his cakes, that claim is not crazy.78 But it is
hard to find a logical stopping point. If cake decorating is speech,
lots of businesses may involve elements of speech. At the oral
argument, Phillips’s lawyer had great difficulty persuading justices
that she could draw a manageable line between products that were
speech and products that were not.79
Phillips also had a federal free exercise claim. But for that, he
had to show that the Colorado law was not neutral, or not generally
applicable. His lawyers obviously doubted whether he could show
that; they gave much more attention to the free speech claim.80
No one who supported the state and the same-sex couple took
the free-exercise theory seriously. A prominent law professor on a
listserv, which I am not permitted to cite, said that the Court would
reject the free speech theory and then dispose of the free-exercise
theory in a paragraph. This widespread disdain for the freeexercise claim resulted from the rhetoric of Employment Division v.
Smith still dominating close textual analysis of Smith and Lukumi.
I frequently collaborate with Thomas Berg at St. Thomas
University in Minnesota. Professor Berg and I filed an amicus brief
devoted solely to free exercise.81 We argued for an exemption only
for small businesses and only for events directly related to the
wedding. This focus on the religious context would lead to a much
narrower exemption than the free speech theory, which would
have protected even simple bigots in any expressive context instead
of just those with sincere religious objections in religious contexts.
The Colorado public-accommodations law had no explicit
secular exceptions. But we said that it had been enforced in
discriminatory ways that created an implicit secular exception, and
this secular exception meant that the law was not generally

78. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, https://www.masterpiececakes.com [https://perma
.cc/P2GH-GGQL].
79. Transcript of Oral Argument 11–20, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 6025739.
80. See Brief for Petitioners 16–38, Masterpiece, 2017 WL 3913762 (free-speech claim);
id. at 38–46 (free-exercise claim); id. at 46–48 (hybrid-rights claim).
81. Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Masterpiece, 2017 WL 4005662.
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applicable. The Court did not say that, but it relied on much of the
same evidence to say something that led to nearly the same place.
It said that the law was not neutral, because Colorado’s
enforcement pattern showed hostility to religion.82
Some of the Civil Rights Commissioners had made hostile
statements on the record, blaming religious liberty for slavery and
the Holocaust and calling Jack Phillips’s religious commitments
“despicable.”83 Views of that sort are very widespread, and some
commentators have publicly defended these comments,84 but
public officials have now been warned not to talk about them. So
those facts may not recur.
The other evidence is more important. A Christian activist
named William Jack went to three different bakers, requesting
cakes in the shape of a Bible, with scriptural quotations hostile to
same-sex marriage. Some of the messages were offensive from the
perspective of most people who did not already share Jack’s views.
Jack had not requested just any anti-gay cake, but explicitly religious
anti-gay cakes. Each baker refused to make his cake, he charged
them with religious discrimination, and the Civil Rights Division
(the prosecuting arm of the Commission) dismissed the charges.85
The same Colorado law that prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation also prohibits discrimination on the
basis of “creed,” which the accompanying regulations define to
include any religious practice or belief.86 So the Colorado courts
had to explain why the Masterpiece baker violated the statute and
the bakers in the William Jack cases didn’t. And in the course of
doing that, the Colorado Court of Appeals said some deeply
inconsistent things.
Most fundamentally, it said that refusing to make a cake closely
associated with same-sex couples discriminated on the basis of
82. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32.
83. Id. at 1729–30.
84. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 133, 138–43 (2018).
85. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31.
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (Thomson Reuters 2015) (prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of protected classifications); 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1:10.2(H) (clarifying that
the law’s prohibition of creedal discrimination protects “all aspects of religious beliefs,
observances or practices . . . as well as the beliefs or teachings of a particular religion, church,
denomination or sect”).
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sexual orientation, but that refusing to make a cake closely
associated with conservative Christians did not discriminate on the
basis of religion.87
For the protected bakers, the court assumed that the cake’s
message would be the bakers’ message and not just the customers’;
the protected bakers could lawfully object to “the offensive nature
of the requested message.”88 For Jack Phillips, the court said that a
wedding cake would send no message, but if it did send one, it
would be the customer’s message, not the baker’s.89
The protected bakers’ willingness to produce cakes with other
“Christian themes” for other Christian customers was treated as
exonerating.90 Petitioner’s willingness to produce other cakes and
baked goods for same-sex couples was treated as irrelevant.91
For Jack Phillips, the fact that he would merely be complying
with the law meant that he would send no message.92 For the other
bakers, this argument went unmentioned.
The court also said that in the William Jack cases, the customer
wanted objectionable words or symbols on the cake, but that in Jack
Phillips’s discussion with the same-sex couple that sued him, he did
not learn what they wanted on their cake.93 This argument has been
picked up very widely on the same-sex couples’ side of the debate,94
but it is deeply disingenuous.
In the actual transaction, Phillips could surely assume that the
couple wanted some words or symbols on the cake, and an essential
part of his task was to help them choose those words and symbols.95
In any event, the very purpose of a wedding cake is to celebrate the
87. Compare Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 (Colo. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that opposition to same-sex marriage shows motive to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation, because the two are “closely correlated”), rev’d, Masterpiece, 138
S. Ct. 1719, with id. at 282 n.8 (concluding that opposition to religious message does not show
motive to discriminate on the basis of religion).
88. Id. at 282 n.8.
89. Id. at 286.
90. Id. at 282 n.8.
91. Id. at 282.
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id. at 285, 288.
94. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 155; Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson
Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMM. 171, 189–90 (2019).
95. Joint Appendix at 161, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4232758.
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wedding and the marriage, with or without an inscription. As even
the Colorado court said, the couple asked Phillips to “design and
create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”96
And under the rest of the Colorado court’s reasoning, the case
would have come out the same way even if the conversation had
lasted longer and the couple had said they wanted two men in
tuxedos, “David ♥ Charlie,” a rainbow, or any other more explicit
message. The court’s logic would still have said that it would be
the customer’s message, not the baker’s; that the baker would
merely be doing what the law required; and that refusing to
produce a message so closely associated with same-sex couples
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. I do not believe
that the Civil Rights Commission or the Colorado Court of Appeals
would rule any differently in a case where the couple requested an
explicit message.
Most fundamentally, I don’t believe it because if refusing a cake
with an explicit message is protected, then the conscientiously
objecting bakers win. They just need to know enough law to keep
the conversation going until the explicit message is chosen or
revealed. Protection for explicit messages would not be much help
to florists or caterers, but it would largely solve the problem for
bakers, printers, calligraphers, and website designers. And the gayrights side of this debate will not settle for that. A pending
Kentucky case does involve an explicit message—a printer asked to
make t-shirts with the words “Lexington Pride Festival 2012” and
a series of rainbow-colored circles—and the enforcement agency
and its amici are all arguing that the printer discriminated when he
refused to print that message and that his free-speech rights are no
defense.97
Even if the Colorado court’s alleged distinctions were more
persuasive, and even if they succeeded in placing the two sets of
bakers in different doctrinal categories under state law, that would
not change the bottom line. The conscience of bakers who support
same-sex marriage, or refuse to oppose same-sex marriage, is
96. Craig, 370 P.3d at 276 (emphasis added), rev’d, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719.
97. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc.,
No. 2015-CA-00745-MR, 2017 WL 2211381, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), review granted
(Ky. Oct. 25, 2017).
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protected. The conscience of bakers who object to same-sex
marriage is not protected.
This discrimination is like the ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul,98 where racial epithets were illegal, but “racist,” “bigot,” and
a vast range of other offensive epithets were permitted. State law
placed the two sets of epithets in different doctrinal categories, and
the correlation between the epithets hurled and the speakers and
viewpoints regulated was imperfect. But these distinctions could
not save a regime that effectively “license[d] one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.”99 It is no more defensible for Colorado to allow
one side to follow the dictates of conscience while requiring the
other side to submit its conscience to the demands of any customer
who walks in the door.
The Supreme Court did not invoke R.A.V., and it did not rely
on all the evidence I have outlined. But it relied on important parts
of it. It noted the inconsistency about whether any message would
be the baker’s message or the customer’s message,100 and the
inconsistency about the bakers’ willingness to provide other goods
and services to the protected class.101 And it focused on the
Colorado court’s statement that the protected bakers could refuse
to provide the “offensive” message that William Jack had
requested. “A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of
these two instances cannot be based on the government’s own
assessment of offensiveness.”102
Much of the commentary has treated the Court’s decision as
confined to an odd set of facts, and as avoiding the underlying
question of whether wedding vendors with conscientious
objections can be required to assist with same-sex weddings.103 But
these facts are readily reproducible. Wedding vendors seeking
exemptions can send testers like William Jack to request an
offensively conservative religious version of the same goods or
services. And we can confidently expect state enforcement officials
to react just as they did in Colorado, protecting the conscience of
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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the vendors they agree with. If liberal business people don’t have
to provide conservative religious goods or services that they find
offensive or violative of conscience, then Masterpiece says that
conservative believers don’t have to do same-sex weddings that
offend them and violate their conscience.
This means that the Supreme Court has gone much further than
is generally recognized toward protecting wedding vendors. And
it has taken a substantial step toward the protective understanding
of Employment Division v. Smith—that even one or a few secular
exceptions make a law not neutral, or not generally applicable. If
the law is not neutral, or not generally applicable, religious
conscientious objectors are entitled to an exemption unless there is
a compelling government interest in requiring them to comply.
And the state’s willingness to grant secular exemptions seriously
undermines any claim to a compelling interest in enforcing the law
without exceptions.
III. RATIONALIZING UNEQUAL TREATMENT
This requirement to treat claims consistently will be effective
only if courts take it seriously. States will try to manipulate their
rules to justify unequal treatment of objectors they agree with and
those they don’t. One such attempted manipulation is the argument
that Masterpiece and the William Jack cases were distinguishable
because only William Jack asked bakers to write explicit messages
in frosting.104 But even if that distinction were valid, it could not be
generalized; the next conscientious objector may wait until explicit
words are requested, and the next William Jack may not request
explicit words or symbols but just explain that the cake is for an
offensive celebration.
In Masterpiece, four Justices accepted a manipulative argument
with much broader potential application. Justice Kagan’s
concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent both argued that the
state’s discrimination could have been justified on the ground that
the protected bakers would not sell an anti-gay cake to anybody,
but Phillips would sell wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.105
104. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
105. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1750 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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But as Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence explained, this reaches the
preordained result by manipulating the level of generality.106 It
treats the anti-gay cake as having a distinctive message, but the progay cake, the cake for the same-sex wedding, as merely generic. If
the anti-gay cake is a unique product because of its message, then
the category is not cakes, or wedding cakes, but cakes with a
particular message. And with or without words or symbols, the
point of a wedding cake is to celebrate the wedding and the
marriage. This may be clearest when the message is explicit; a
wedding cake with two brides, two male names, or the like is a cake
that Phillips would not sell to anybody. But with or without such
symbols, the cake sends a celebratory message in support of a samesex wedding. Even the Colorado court acknowledged this when it
was simply describing the facts and not yet trying to justify its
decision.107
Here’s another way to think about the same point. The attempt
to rationalize what Colorado did would treat an anti-gay cake and
a gay-pride cake as two different products, and the protected
bakers wouldn’t make one of those products for anybody. But it
treats the same-sex wedding cake and the opposite-sex wedding
cake as the same product, distinguished not by their different
messages, but only by the identity of the customer. State law can
treat each of these pairs of cakes as comprising one product or two.
But it cannot say that one pair of cakes is the same—just one
product—and that the other pair is different—two distinct
products. Both pairs are the same at one level of generality—two
cakes about gay rights, or two cakes about weddings—and both
cakes are different at a more specific level of generality,
expressing opposite views of the common subject matter. We come
back to the same basic contradiction. The Colorado courts, and the
liberal Justices, treated Jack Phillips as making a decision about the
customer, but the protected bakers as making a decision about
the message.
Colorado invoked this distinction to avoid enforcing its statute
in a generally applicable way. Colorado prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, and on the basis of creed, in the same
terms in the same statute. It has asserted an interest in preventing
106. Id. at 1737–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
107. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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discrimination against groups that have historically been the
targets of widespread discrimination, or on the basis of
classifications that have historically been the bases for widespread
discrimination. It did not have to include both religion and sexual
orientation in that protection, but it quite sensibly chose to do so.
That choice defined the reach of Colorado’s interest in the case. The
state’s conclusion that the law did not apply to the William Jack
bakers undermined its interest in ending discrimination to the same
extent as a conclusion that Masterpiece Cakeshop was entitled to
exemption from the law on grounds of religious liberty—or less
plausibly but more parallel to the William Jack holdings, that
Masterpiece had not violated the law.
Lawrence Sager and Nelson Tebbe endorse these alleged
distinctions between Masterpiece and the William Jack cases, but
they also make a much more sweeping claim.108 They repeatedly
invoke Charles Black’s famous defense of the desegregation
decisions: African-Americans’ right to equal treatment trumped
any alleged white right not to associate, because there was no
equivalence between the white and black populations in the
American South in the middle of the twentieth century.109 “[A]
whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is
set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an
inferior station.”110 Professor Black briefly described a system of
pervasive segregation in every aspect of life that “comes down in
apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case,”111 in
which blacks were denied voting rights and barred “from all
political power,”112 in which separate facilities were “almost never
really equal” and black schools were “so disgracefully inferior to
white schools” that to call them equal was a “Molochian childdestroying lie.”113

108. Sager & Tebbe, supra note 94, at 173, 187, 187–88.
109. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960).
110. Id. at 424
111. Id.
112. Id. at 425.
113. Id. at 425–26. Moloch was “a Canaanite deity associated in biblical sources with . . .
child sacrifice.” Noah Tesch, Moloch, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/topic/Moloch-ancient-god [https://perma.cc/UF2M-LLHF].

189

004.LAYCOCK_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/13/19 3:41 AM

2019

He might have added that in this system, whites controlled the
vast majority of economic power and resources; nonwhite income
per capita in the South was about half of white income.114 There was
an African-American middle class in major cities,115 sustained in
part by segregation, which created a self-contained AfricanAmerican market. But many or most African-Americans were
economically dependent on the whites who oppressed them.116
Threatened or actual violence further enforced the system.117 This
system had the overwhelming support of whites in the South, and
intense social pressure forced most potential dissenters to keep
any doubts to themselves.118 Southern “moderates” were
segregationists who were reluctant to defy the courts.119
Sager and Tebbe’s assertion that the LGBT community is in a
similar situation today is absurd, and they make essentially no
effort to support their claim. Certainly gays and lesbians were
treated badly in the past, and the problem has not been entirely
114. Data squarely comparable to current data on same-sex couples have been difficult
to find, but several data sets yield a consistent picture. Among male workers employed for
twelve months in 1939, urban nonwhites in the South earned 41% of what whites earned;
rural nonwhites earned 37%. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 105 tbl.9 (2d
ed. 1971). In 1950, black male income as a proportion of white male income in southern
Standard Metropolitan Areas ranged from 37% in Montgomery, Alabama to 76% in El Paso,
Texas (where only 2.4% of the population was black). Calculated from id. at 124–25 tbl.12.
The central tendency appears to have been just over 50%. Id. Either this was a good bit better
than in 1939, possibly because of the post-war boom, or the situation in the largest cities was
a good bit better than in smaller cities, or a combination of the two. I could not find data for
the South in 1960, but nationwide, white median family income was $5835; the nonwhite
median was $3233, or 55% of white income. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1962 at 334, tbl.450. Of course the numbers for African-Americans would have been worse
in the South. BECKER, supra, at 116.
115. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 34 (1961).
116. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (noting that “fear of
community hostility and economic reprisals” led many members of National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People to drop their membership when city demanded
membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (noting
“uncontroverted showing” that disclosure of NAACP’s membership lists had resulted in
“economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility”).
117. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (noting “substantial uncontroverted evidence” of
“harassment and threats of bodily harm” when NAACP membership was revealed);
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462 (recognizing “threat of physical coercion” for NAACP members).
118. See, e.g., PELTASON, supra note 115, at 9–10 (reporting how federal judges were
ostracized for enforcing the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions).
119. Id. at 33–35.
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solved. We might plausibly say that the combination of sodomy
laws, moral disapproval, and employment discrimination was a
“system” designed to keep gays and lesbians in the closet. But even
at its peak, that system was not remotely so pervasive, and did not
reach nearly so many parts of life, as segregation in the American
South. And any such system has been declining for decades. Most
obviously, the sodomy laws had not been enforced for many years
before they were finally held unconstitutional in 2003.120
In contrast to monolithic southern-white support for
subordinating African-Americans when Professor Black wrote,
Gallup reports that 67% of Americans believe that same-sex
marriages should be valid and with the same rights as traditional
marriages.121 The Public Religion Research Institute found 62%
support with a somewhat larger sample size and somewhat
differently worded question.122 In the PRRI survey, 31% strongly
supported same-sex marriage, and only 14% were strongly
opposed.123 Majorities in every state now support gay-rights
legislation124—which of course does not mean that it can be passed
everywhere, especially without religious exemptions—and gay
reporters write optimistic columns about rapid progress in
red states.125

120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003) (reviewing the long history of nonenforcement with respect to consensual sodomy in private). Police surveillance designed to
enforce the sodomy laws at least in public restrooms was a serious hazard for gay men at a
time when most were in the closet and had difficulty finding each other. One famous such
incident was the arrest in 1964 of presidential aide Walter Jenkins for a same-sex encounter
in a YMCA changing room. Laura Smith, When LBJ’s Closest Aide Was Caught in a Gay Sex
Sting, the President Caved—the First Lady Stood Up, TIMELINE (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://timeline.com/walter-jenkins-gay-lbj-21d71a731021
[https://perma.cc/WZ23673A].
121. Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May
23,
2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/234866/two-three-americans-support-sexmarriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MDF-M8UD].
122. Daniel Greenberg, Maxine Najle, Oyindamola Bola & Robert P. Jones, Fifty Years
After Stonewall: Widespread Support for LGBT Issues—Findings from American Values Atlas 2018,
https://www.prri.org/research/fifty-years-after-stonewall-widespread-support-for-lgbt
-issues-findings-from-american-values-atlas-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Q7QX-3Y2C].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Samantha Allen, How “Real America” Became Queer America, N.Y. TIMES, March 13,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/opinion/lgbt-trump-red-states.html [https:
//perma.cc/S59H-DU2K].
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The LGBT community votes without hindrance and is an
important part of the working coalition of one of our two major
political parties; it is guaranteed strong political support from that
party. It is not segregated; there are no segregated facilities or
segregated schools to be equal or unequal.
In Census Bureau data, same-sex couples report higher
educational achievement, higher rates of employment, and higher
median incomes than opposite-sex couples.126 Read that sentence
again; these are unexpected data. These differences hold even when
all cohabiting same-sex couples, married and unmarried, are
compared to married opposite-sex couples; the differences are
larger when only same-sex and opposite-sex married couples are
compared. These data on income and education are radically
different from similar data by race, even today and nationwide, let
alone in the segregated South in 1960.127
There are well over half a million same-sex married couples in
the country,128 and the number of litigated cases of religiously
motivated refusals to provide goods or services to all those
weddings appears to be in the very low two digits at most.129 No
126. Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple Households: 2005 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house
-characteristics.html (hereinafter Same-Sex Couple Households). The information in the text
comes from Tables 1 and 2 of the 2017 data.
127. For income, see Kayla Fontenot, Jessica Semega & Melissa Kollar, Current
Population Reports: Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU at 28, 31
(tbl.A-1),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018
/demo/p60-263.pdf (reporting median income for white households as $65,273, compared
to $40,902 for black households). For education, see Educational Attainment in the United
States 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018
/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html (reporting total population and
numbers of degrees by race, from which it can be calculated that 33% of whites and 23% of
African-Americans have a bachelor’s degree or higher). Racial differences in employment
are less dramatic. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S.
DEP’T LABOR: BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, at tbl.5 under Employment Status,
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XKC-BLCW] (reporting that
in 2018, 60.7% of whites and 58.3% of blacks were employed).
128. Adam P. Romero, 1.1 Million LGBT Adults Are Married to Someone of the Same Sex at
the Two-Year Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW,
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Obergefell-2-Year-Marriages
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD3D-ZQAY]; Same-Sex Couple Households, supra note 126 (reporting
similar numbers).
129. I list ten at notes 65–76 supra. One of those (Hands on Originals) is not a wedding
case, and two (Brush and Nib and 303 Creative) are pre-enforcement challenges, not suits or
administrative complaints by an actual couple referred elsewhere. Kendrick and
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doubt there are other couples who preferred to work with a vendor
who genuinely welcomed their business and who decided that it
wasn’t worth the time, trouble, and aggravation to sue the
conscientious objector who referred them elsewhere. Some couples
see such a referral as gravely offensive, but almost certainly, other
couples see it as a minor matter if done civilly, part of the friction
of living in a pluralistic society. Whatever the total numbers, it is
impossible to conjure a systemic problem out of this handful of
known cases.
Of course I do not claim that all problems of hostility to the
LGBT community have been solved. Sporadic discrimination and
even violence continues. In some communities, discrimination is
still widespread, and in those places, if most wedding vendors (or
the only wedding vendor) discriminate, religious exemptions must
be denied on compelling interest grounds.130 No doubt all these
problems are worse, and more widespread, for transgender
persons than for gays and lesbians. There is still much work to be
done. But making martyrs of a handful of conscientious objectors is
a singularly counterproductive way of attempting that work.
The polling data and the socio-economic data show that these
remaining problems are very far from systemic. They are not
remotely comparable to the plight of African-Americans when
Charles Black wrote. Refusal to protect religious liberty cannot be
justified by the absurd claim that conservative Christians today
systematically suppress gays and lesbians in the way that southern
whites systematically suppressed African-Americans through the
mid-twentieth century.
Schwartzman list two state administrative-agency cases that I had trouble locating and do
not list above. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 133 n.2. They also list a Michigan
case that appears to have focused on the vendor’s literal speech explaining his conscientious
objection rather than his conduct in serving or not serving some same-sex couple. Country
Mill Farms, LLC v. City of E. Lansing, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (W.D. Mich. 2017). Probably both
they and I have missed some. Whatever the exact number, it is very small.
130. This has long been my position. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 199–201 (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds. 2008) (setting out this position and
its rationale); LAYCOCK, VOLUME THREE, supra note 4, at 766 (setting out this proviso in the
statutory text we proposed to state legislatures considering marriage legislation); Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty, Health Care, and the Culture Wars, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH
IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 32–33 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper,
eds. 2017) (further explaining the rationale and applying this principle to Catholic hospitals
with local monopolies over reproductive health care).
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The Republican Party still opposes gay-rights laws, and neither
Congress nor red states have enacted such laws. The election of
Donald Trump was a major setback, reflecting many sources of
alienation among his voters, including the strength of the reaction
to racial, sexual, and LGBT equality, but also including the
existential fears of conservative Christians. They foresee not just
that the supporters of sexual freedom will gain more rights, but that
conservative believers will continue to lose rights—that their
freedom to live their own lives in accordance with their faith is
targeted and on course to elimination. The wedding-vendor cases,
which generate publicity all out of proportion to their number, fuel
this fear. So do all the other culture-war disputes that put religious
liberty at issue. The Solicitor General’s alarming and foolish answer
at the oral argument in Obergefell—that tax exemption for churches
would be at issue in the wake of same-sex marriage131—drove this
fear to greater heights, creating widespread panic in conservative
churches.132 Congress and red states will never enact gay-rights
laws without meaningful religious exemptions; religious
exemptions are essential to further progress for gay rights.
Like the LGBT community, conservative believers are a
minority group with important rights at risk. Recall that only a
third of the population opposes same-sex marriage. Evangelical
Protestants are only a quarter of the population,133 and 35 percent
of them support same-sex marriage.134 The remaining 65 percent
are only a sixth of the population, and presumably, only some of
them feel strongly about the issue. Two-thirds of Catholics support
131. Oral Argument on Question 1, at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(No. 14-556 et al.), 2015 WL 1929996.
132. See, e.g., David Bernstein, The Supreme Court Oral Argument That Cost Democrats the
Presidency, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (DEC. 7, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/07/the-supreme-court-oral-argument
-that-cost-democrats-the-presidency/?utm_term=.7d17f2985d24 [https://perma.cc/584N
-2HL8] (Dec. 7, 2016) (surveying this and similar issues, and reporting widespread
alarm about the Solicitor General’s answers in conservative and religious websites
and publications).
133. Pew Research Center, America’s Changing Religious Landscape (May 12, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ [https:
//perma.cc/ECH5-T74D].
134. Pew Research Center, Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage (June 26, 2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://per
ma.cc/4QPU-SNHD].
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same-sex marriage, identical to the number in the general
population.135 Religious conservatives have been steadily losing on
sexual issues at least since the 1960s, and in less dramatic ways for
longer than that.
Today, the views of religious conservatives are extremely
unpopular. They are routinely accused of bigotry, hate, and evil.136
The wedding vendors who refer same-sex couples elsewhere are
often (I assume routinely, but I don’t know that) targeted with
boycotts, vandalism, hate mail, and defamatory reviews on
consumer websites.137 The bakers who turned away William Jack
did so because of strong moral disapproval of what he was doing
and asking them to do—moral disapproval strong enough to
overcome their self-interest in maximizing sales. He experienced
that moral disapproval just as same-sex couples experience moral
disapproval when turned away by conservative Christians.
Conservative religious views on some issues deserve to be
unpopular. But these views are constitutionally protected religious
beliefs. Other Americans can disapprove and try to persuade, but
as the Supreme Court said in Masterpiece, government must treat
these views with neutrality and tolerance.138 Disapproving private
citizens can express their disapproval in many ways, but they too
would do well to treat these constitutionally protected beliefs with
greater tolerance

135. Id.
136. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839,
869–71 (collecting examples); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion,
88 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 407, 415–17 (2011) (collecting more examples); supra notes
83–84 and accompanying text (noting statements of Civil Rights Commissioners and
their defenders).
137. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, 2019 WL 2382063, *3 (Wash. June 6,
2019) (briefly noting threats and hostile messages directed to conscientious objector in that
case); infra note 140 and accompanying text (citing reports from Jack Phillips concerning
Masterpiece Cakeshop); Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 253–54 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoe
Robinson, eds. 2016) (collecting news accounts about Sweet Cakes by Melissa and boycotts
of the whole state of Indiana); Indiana Pizza Restaurant Says It Wouldn’t Cater
a Gay Wedding, Supports Religious Freedom Law (April 1, 2015, 5:12 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/indiana-pizza-restaurant-cater-gay-wedding-supports
-religious/story?id=30045085 [https://perma.cc/HEN2-BJVS?type=image] (describing
threat of arson and a flood of defamatory Yelp ratings against a pizza restaurant that merely
answered a reporter’s question about whether it would cater a same-sex wedding).
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
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What is ultimately at stake for both sides is the right to live their
own lives in accord with their own identities and their own deepest
values. When Masterpiece Cakeshop declined to do a same-sex
wedding, it did not threaten those rights for the same-sex couple.
They understandably felt offended and insulted on that one
occasion. But their lives went on as before: insofar as anything that
Jack Phillips did, they still loved each other, they were still married,
they did not have to change their jobs or occupations, they did not
have to violate their conscience or their understanding of marriage
or of sexual attraction. They continued to live in accord with their
own identity and values.
The situation is very different for conscientious objectors
ordered to help celebrate same-sex weddings. They must
permanently surrender either their conscience or their occupation
to comply with a state order enforceable by fines, damage awards,
and the power to punish for contempt of court. Jack Phillips quit
making wedding cakes in response to Colorado’s order. He gave
up forty percent of his business and forty percent of his income, and
laid off most of his employees, to follow his conscience.139 And until
and unless his right to act on conscience is finally resolved, that loss
is permanent. If he had made the opposite choice, violating his
conscience and disrupting or severing his relationship with his
God, that loss would also have been permanent.
What we have here are two minority groups, sexual and
religious, each subject to hostile treatment or regulation supported
by the other, and each entitled to constitutional protection.
Colorado was right to protect both groups against discrimination.
And it was right to hold that bakers deeply offended by the William
Jack cakes did not have to make those cakes. It was wrong to refuse
parallel protection to Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop.
IV. CONTINUING LITIGATION
Colorado, and at least some gay activists in Colorado, remained
determined to get Jack Phillips. He reports that his store has been
vandalized and that he has received death threats and countless

139. Brief for Petitioners 2, 6, 28, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017
WL 3913762.
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hateful phone calls and e-mails.140 And he has received repeated
requests for cakes that the purported customer knows he will not
make.141 Cakes honoring Satan have been a popular request.
One such test order came on the day the Supreme Court agreed
to hear his case. It would not have served the tester’s purpose to
order a wedding cake, because Phillips was no longer making
wedding cakes for anybody. And the person ordering surely knew
that; the news was on his website.142 The tester was Autumn
Scardina, a practicing lawyer who describes her firm and its
members as “passionate supporters of LGBT rights.”143 So she
asked for a cake that was blue on the outside, and pink on the
inside, and she said it was to celebrate her gender transition.144
Phillips’s wife said they could not make that cake.145 Scardina filed
a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission, which is why we
know her identity. And a month after the Supreme Court’s opinion,
the Commission’s director found that Masterpiece Cakeshop had
again violated the law.146
Masterpiece responded with a federal lawsuit to enjoin further
enforcement efforts by the Civil Rights Commission. The court
denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss the claims for
injunctive relief, rejecting the Commission’s argument for Younger
abstention because Masterpiece had adequately alleged that the
state was proceeding in bad faith.147 The relevant allegations were

140. Complaint ¶¶ 159–63, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D.
Colo.), ECF No. 1 (Aug. 14, 2018).
141. Id. ¶ 4.
142. Masterpiece Cakeshop, http://masterpiececakes.com/wedding-cakes/. As of June
2019, the content of this page has been blocked or removed. The page as it appeared in April
2019 is available at https://perma.cc/N7BM-UFD4.
143. Scardina Law, https://www.scardinalaw.com/Family-Law/LGBT-Law.shtml
[https://perma.cc/UP77-BWGP].
144. Determination 2, Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo. Civil Rights Div. July 2, 2018).
This Determination does not appear to be available on the website of the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, but it is available on Pacer as Exhibit A to the Complaint in the ensuing
litigation, supra note 140.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 3–4.
147. Order 17–23, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. Colo.),
ECF No. 94 (Jan. 4, 2019) (hereinafter Order). Younger abstention generally requires federal
courts to defer adjudication of challenges to state law when the claim could be presented in
a state enforcement proceeding that was pending before the federal case was filed. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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of undisputed facts, and the court agreed with Masterpiece on how
to characterize those facts, finding bad faith in the continued
unequal treatment of Masterpiece and the bakers that had
been protected in the William Jack cases.148 For readers inclined to
blame Republican judges for all such decisions, this one was
rendered by Judge Wiley Daniel, an African-American judge
appointed by Bill Clinton.149
Two months later, in early March 2019, Colorado’s Attorney
General announced a settlement in which both Masterpiece and the
Commission dropped all claims against each other.150 But that
settlement did not bind Scardina, who filed a new lawsuit against
Masterpiece and Phillips in early June.151 She now alleges that the
gender-transition cake was really just a birthday cake, and that
Phillips refused to make a birthday cake for a transgender
customer.152 This allegation appears to be at least in some tension
with her earlier allegations to the Civil Rights Commission.
Scardina’s complaint about her gender-transition cake is a step
beyond the Supreme Court’s decision in one way that seems
important to me: it does not involve a wedding. The cake would
not be served in a religious context, or even in an analogous context;
there is no religious equivalent to a gender-transition celebration. I
think that Phillips should still be protected, but for me, this is a
somewhat harder case than a wedding cake.
Perhaps it would be harder for the Court as well. The
Masterpiece opinion did not emphasize the religious significance of
weddings, and it did not even mention Phillips’s religious
148. Order, supra note 147, at 17–23.
149. Federal Judicial Center, Wiley Young Daniel, https://www.fjc.gov/history
/judges/daniel-wiley-young [https://perma.cc/PQU4-DGGR].
150. Lawrence Pacheco, State of Colorado and Masterpiece Cakeshop Agree to End All
Litigation (Mar. 5, 2019), https://coag.gov/press-room/press-releases/03-05-19 [https:
//perma.cc/ENJ6-FR6X]; see also Elise Schmelzer, Masterpiece Cakeshop, State of Colorado,
Agree to Mutual Ceasefire over Harassment, Discrimination Claims, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 2019,
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/05/masterpiece-cakeshop-colorado-mutual-cease
fire-over-claims/ [https://perma.cc/27KR-3BS3] (reporting additional details).
151. 4CBS Denver, Third Discrimination Suit Filed Against Masterpiece Cakeshop,
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2019/06/06/discrimination-lawsuit-lakewood-jack-phillipsmasterpiece-cakeshop/ [https://perma.cc/P973-K44U].
152. Complaint ¶¶ 13–23, Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., No. 2019CV32214,
Dist. Ct. for the City and Cty. of Denver, https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/ScardinaMasterpiece-COMPLAINT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6L2-6VG8].
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understanding of marriage and weddings, but it did briefly
contrast weddings with other goods and services. The Court
“assumed” that requiring clergy to perform wedding ceremonies
over their objections would violate free exercise, said that this
exception to civil-rights laws must be “confined,” and then noted
that “there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no
one could argue implicate the First Amendment.”153 Is a gendertransition cake such a good?
I think not; Phillips should be protected from making a cake to
celebrate a gender transition. The gender-transition cake is still a
demand that Phillips commit his talents to celebrating something
deeply at odds with his religious faith. A celebration inherently
includes a message—that the event celebrated is a good thing,
worthy of celebrating. That is why Scardina specified a celebration,
at least as she initially told the story. And Phillips’s claim of
conscience is still narrowly focused on a particular celebration and
on a message with high religious significance for him.
Narrow focus goes to the argument about compelling
government interest. An exemption for merchants who refuse to
serve gays or transgender persons at all, or in a wide range of
transactions, would inflict much more harm on the LGBT
community. It would threaten frequent refusals of goods or
services instead of very occasional refusals in a few religiously
sensitive situations. If Scardina had really ordered just a birthday
cake, I think that Masterpiece should not be protected. But an
exemption for celebrating gender transitions would not threaten
widespread refusals of goods or services to transgender persons. I
do not think that the state’s interest in this narrowly focused claim
is compelling.
And as the federal district court explained, enforcement of the
Colorado law would still be discriminatory. Colorado has not
abandoned or repudiated the position it took in the William Jack
cases. It is apparently still the state’s position that secular bakers
with views the state agrees with do not have to make cakes they
find offensive, but conservative bakers with views the state
disagrees with do have to make cakes they find offensive. So the
Colorado law is still not generally applicable in my view; it is
153. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28
(2018).
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still administered with hostility to religion and so is not neutral in
the Supreme Court’s view. Either way, the compelling interest test
still applies.
Colorado backed away from pursuing Phillips and a test case,
but the private plaintiff has sued Masterpiece again, and more cases
are in the pipeline.154 If this issue returns to the Court, Justice
Kennedy will no longer be there; Justice Kavanaugh will be. With
Kennedy’s retirement, there is no one left from the Court that
decided Employment Division v. Smith.155 There has been a
generational transition in the conservative legal movement.
The modern conservative legal movement began in reaction to
what it perceived as the activism of the Warren Court.156 It
emphasized deference to the political branches, and that was the
theme of the Smith opinion. Justice Scalia wasn’t hostile to religion;
he was hostile to the judicial balancing of interests inherent in the
compelling government interest test. Better that small religions be
disadvantaged, he said, than that judges balance the believer’s
interest in every religious practice against the government’s
interest in regulating that practice.157
Scalia plainly envisioned that the victims of his decision would
be small religions and idiosyncratic religious practices.158 He did
not foresee that our largest religions—his religion—would need the
protections of religious liberty for moral teachings of great
importance to them.
Both of these things have changed. Today’s conservative judges
are as activist as the Warren Court ever was. Decades in the judicial
majority can lead you to believe that judicial activism is a good
thing. If you have the power, you will eventually decide to use it.
And in the highly visible culture-war cases, the victimized religions
today are conservative Christians—Catholics and evangelicals
most frequently. The Court’s conservatives have vigorously

154. See supra note 152 (new Masterpiece suit); supra notes 71–72, 76 (cases in pipeline).
155. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
156. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (condemning many Warren Court decisions as unprincipled).
157. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5, 890 (rejecting a system “in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs”).
158. Id. at 890 (“leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in”).
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enforced the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, most
notably in the contraception cases.159 If the Court takes another
wedding-vendor case, and if Jack Phillips’s amicus brief tells the
story of the carefully contrived case of the gender-transition cake
and the district court’s finding that the state acted in bad faith, the
conservatives are likely to see persecution—a concerted effort to
force Phillips to surrender his faith or his business. They will likely
want to protect wedding vendors with a clear rule that states
cannot misinterpret or evade. Lest this paragraph be
misunderstood: active enforcement of textually explicit
constitutional rights is generally a good thing. And the Free
Exercise Clause is a textually explicit right. Other recent decisions
are far more activist and dubious, but it is no part of this Article to
survey those decisions here.
Some religious conservatives look forward to Smith being
overruled. That could happen; four Justices recently invited
litigants to explicitly present the question.160 And that would be a
better solution than the one I have outlined here. Overruling Smith
would eliminate arguments about whether secular exceptions, like
that granted to the William Jack bakers, are really exceptions and
really analogous to the challenged regulation of religious practice.
Courts could go directly to what should be the real issues: whether
a religious practice has been burdened and whether that burden is
justified by a compelling government interest.
Masterpiece points the way to a solution that is more
complicated, but perhaps easier for the Court than a square
overruling: the Court will build up the protective parts of Smith, the
requirement that laws burdening religion be neutral and generally
applicable. Any secular exception that undermines the interest
offered to justify regulation of religion will show both that the law
is not generally applicable and that it serves no compelling interest.
Such an exception may be written into the law, or it may emerge as
a matter of interpretation. It may be labeled as an exception, or as a
159. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. 682 (2014); see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (unanimously relying on RFRA to protect right to use mildly hallucinogenic tea
in worship service).
160. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
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gap in coverage, or as a claim that one side simply didn’t violate
the law and the other side did.161
Masterpiece gets most of the way there. Its emphasis on the
state’s hostility to Phillips’s faith did it the hard way; it means that
those working to minimize the holding can still read it as a motive
case.162 But that hostility was inferred from the objectively unequal
treatment of Phillips and the other bakers. It is a very short step to
make that focus on objectively unequal treatment even more
explicit, and to make objectively unequal treatment dispositive,
whether or not the factfinder draws an inference of actual hostility.
V. CONCLUSION—THE BIGGER PICTURE
Either overruling Smith or enforcing a serious requirement of
general applicability would lead to much better protection for
religious liberty. And that would be a good thing not just for
conscientiously objecting wedding vendors, but for a broad range
of cases. Do not assume that this battle over legal doctrine is only
about abortion, contraception, and same-sex weddings. The
culture-war cases grow out of deep moral disagreement about
matters relating to sex, and they get all the headlines, but they are
not the typical cases.
The typical cases about religious exemptions present far less
controversial conflicts between pervasive government regulation
and diverse religious practices.163 They mostly—not exclusively
—involve the small religious minorities that Justice Scalia thought
he was disadvantaging in Smith. Despite its deep division in
Masterpiece and the contraception cases, the Supreme Court
unanimously protected a Muslim prisoner’s right to grow a beard,164
a church’s right not to be sued for discrimination by an employee
in a position of religious leadership,165 another church’s right to use

161. See Laycock & Collis, supra note 58, at 17–19 (exploring ways in which exceptions
can be fully intended and communicated outside the text of a statute or regulation).
162. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 146–54 (analyzing and criticizing
Masterpiece as a motive case).
163. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164–71 (2016) (collecting examples).
164. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
165. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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a mildly hallucinogenic tea in its worship services,166 and a third
church’s right to sacrifice small animals.167 Illustrative lower court
cases have involved Sabbath observance,168 grooming rules169,
Amish buggies and Mennonite tractors,170 unnecessary
autopsies,171 churches feeding the homeless,172 and zoning rules
that prevent religious groups from creating places of worship.173
And then there is Mary Stinemetz, the Kansas woman who died
for her faith, in America, in the twenty-first century. She was a
Jehovah’s Witness, so she could not accept a blood transfusion, and
she needed a liver transplant. Bloodless liver transplants were
available in Omaha, and they were actually cheaper than any
transplant hospital in Kansas. But Kansas Medicaid had a rule: we
don’t pay for out-of-state medical care. She sued under the state
constitution, and she eventually won,174 but by then it was too late.
Her condition had deteriorated to the point that she was no longer
medically eligible for a transplant. She died soon thereafter.175 If
you support Employment Division v. Smith176 and oppose religious
exemptions, your explanation has to address why Mary Stinemetz
should not have gotten one. Smith led Kansas officials to believe
that they never have to consider religious exemptions—that they
166. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
167. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
168. Filinovich v. Claar, No. 04 C 7189, 2006 WL 1994580 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2006)
169. See, e.g., EEOC v. Geo Grp. Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (Muslim veil); A.A. ex
rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) (Native American
long hair); Litzman v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 12 Civ. 4681, 2013 WL 6049066 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
15, 2013) (Orthodox Jewish beard).
170. See, e.g., Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835 (Ky. 2012); Mitchell Cty. v.
Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
171. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681, 2007 WL 4209262 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 27, 2007);
Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). Yang played a prominent role in the legislative
hearings that led to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See, e.g., Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1992) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards, chair of the subcommittee) (noting that William Yang’s testimony had provided
“new insight into the importance of this legislation”).
172. Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL 3235317 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 9, 2012); Abbott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 783 So.2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
173. See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and UnderEnforced, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1021 (2012) (collecting and analyzing cases).
174. Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Pol’y Auth., 252 P.3d 141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
175. Brad Cooper, Jehovah’s Witness Who Needed Bloodless Transplant Dies, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Oct. 25, 2012, http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article310218/JehovahsWitness-who-needed-bloodless-transplant-dies.html [https://perma.cc/6CCN-7VU6].
176. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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didn’t have to talk to Mary Stinemetz or take her seriously. And
they didn’t.
As the case of Mary Stinemetz graphically illustrates, and as
Jack Phillips’s surrender of nearly half his business illustrates less
dramatically, religious liberty reduces human suffering. It reduces
social conflict. It is one of America’s great contributions to the
world. We should not let it slip away, either in legal wrangling or
in a bitter culture war. And the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Masterpiece is an important step toward restoring federal
constitutional protection for religious liberty.
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